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5SUMMARY
Capital flows returned to the Latin American in the 1990s after nearly a decade-long of the so-
called debt crisis that featured a negative transfer of resources. These new capital flows were
closely related to the economic reform process in the region. On the one hand, the reforms were
a source of attraction for foreign investors. On the other hand, they helped the reforms succeed
by relieving the external constraint that depressed growth during the 1980s.
Nevertheless, the new inflows also created problems. While average inflows in the 1990s
were very similar to the amounts received before the debt crisis, their volatility was much
greater. This volatility was the source of serious problems for the region, since the reversion of
flows when investors lost confidence led to deep recessions.
Given this problem of volatility, foreign direct investment – which tends to be more
stable as well as to be accompanied by other benefits, such as access to technology and markets –
came to be particularly valued in recent years. This was in contrast to short-term portfolio flows,
which embodied the volatility problem.
It will be important in the future for governments and international bodies to design
policies to limit the volatility of short-term flows and to encourage long-term capital.
7I.  INTRODUCTION
Between 1990 and 1997, Latin American countries experienced a huge increase in the volume of
private capital inflows they attracted. Net private flows to the region reached a record US$88
billion in 1997. It is, however, interesting that the 1997 peak level of private flows reached a
similar level (both in real terms and as percent of GDP) as the peak of inflows during 1981,
when bank lending that had begun in the mid-1970s reached its maximum level. After 1997,
inflows began to decline as a result of the international crisis that began in Asia.
The significant increase in the volume of private flows to Latin America during the 1990s
can be explained by both domestic and international factors. Clearly, the extensive structural
reforms carried out by the majority of countries in the region did much to encourage the return of
private capital. More balanced macroeconomic policies, such as the elimination of budget
deficits and tighter monetary policies, were also crucial to the process. The reforms served both
to ease the entry of foreign capital and increase the creditworthiness of Latin American
borrowers.
External factors have also been extremely important (see Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart,
1993).  First, in the early 1990s, the recession in the industrialized countries and the reduction of
U.S. interest rates were important contributory factors in the influx of foreign funds to Latin
America. This implied that any change to this situation, such as a rise in U.S. interest rates, could
contribute to a reduction of capital flows to the region, as happened in 1994. Second, financial
liberalization in industrialized countries and the growing international diversification of the
portfolios of institutional investors also served to encourage the flow of capital to emerging
markets generally, including to Latin America (Griffith-Jones, 1998). Third, contagion from
crises in other countries or even other regions has become an increasingly important
phenomenon in the 1990s.
The significant increase in the volume of flows to Latin America in the 1990s, itself a
reflection of the increasing integration of global finance, was accompanied by very high
volatility of those flows. Indeed, the pattern of surges and reversals not only has been repeated
over time but has become more frequent in recent years. Two recent crises, the Mexican peso
crisis of 1994-1995 and the international financial crisis of 1997-1999, brought violent swings in
the levels of capital flows to Latin America. The peso crisis led to significant but fairly brief
reversals of portfolio flows to the region in 1995, while the international financial crisis that
began in Asia led to major declines in capital flows to Latin America and a currency crisis in
Brazil. At the time of writing, it is yet unclear how long the relative drought of capital flows to
8Latin America will last, though there are hopes and some evidence that their recovery will be
more like 1995-1996 than 1983-1989.
The high volatility of international capital flows to the region is important because, while
foreign capital inflows can improve growth and investment levels in recipient countries and
thereby help achieve development goals, reversals associated with volatile flows are extremely
damaging. Financial crises, and reversals of financial flows, have a serious negative impact on
the real economies of affected countries, leading to loss of output and increased poverty levels.
Furthermore, volatility itself (of capital flows and of macroeconomic variables) is damaging to
investment, growth, and employment.
One of the effects – and, indeed, one of the aims – of the reforms in Latin America, as
well as elsewhere, has been to attract more capital flows. Often one of the indicators used to
measure success of reforming economies has been whether they attract more capital flows in the
post-reform period. This analysis was based on the assumption that the more capital flows of any
type a country could attract, the more beneficial this was for growth and development.
The highly problematic experience with capital flows in the 1990s, and much of the
recent literature on the subject (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Rodrik 1998; Bhagwati, 1998), raise
the clear possibility that, for certain categories of capital flows (easily reversible ones) and
especially if those flows enter on a very large scale, their long-term net growth and development
benefits may be negative.  While the high costs of reversals of these flows are evident, the
benefits of inflows are less clear. At the same time, there is growing empirical evidence
(Borensztein, de Gregorio and Lee, 1995; Ffrench-Davis and Reisen, 1998) that foreign direct
investment (FDI)contributes to long-term growth.  This is for three reasons:  a) it is on the whole
more stable; b) it is complementary to domestic investment, both in production and through
positive spill over effects; and c) it stimulates growth through the embodied transfer of
technology and efficiency, as well as facilitating access to foreign markets.
If correct, this analysis implies a complex relationship between reforms, capital flows,
and growth. Reforms in general, ceteris paribus, tend to attract more capital flows of all
categories. It would seem that specific reforms – such as a certain type of capital account
liberalization – tend to contribute more to attract larger amounts of potentially volatile capital
flows, which can often undermine rather than contribute to the additional growth that other
reforms, --such as trade liberalization-- are generating in the economy.  At the same time, other
reforms – such as privatization and labor market reforms – help to attract FDI, which seems to
have clear net beneficial effects on growth. Also, on the positive side, it may be the case that
those countries that have implemented "second generation" reforms (including aspects such as
development of long-term capital markets and proper regulation of the domestic financial sector)
in addition to a "first generation" of liberalizing reforms, may be somewhat less vulnerable to
large reversals of capital flows. Above all they may recover access to capital and credit markets
somewhat more easily. Indeed, it is also interesting to note that the international debt or financial
crises originated in Latin America in the early 1980s (before the reforms), while in 1997-1999
the international financial crisis originated in other parts of the world. Less encouraging is the
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contagion, in spite of their important efforts at structural reform and at improving
macroeconomic policies.
The policy implications of these more complex relationships have to be more nuanced
than were those emerging from the conventional analysis in the past, which was based on the
almost theological assumption that international capital and credit markets were always efficient.
The new realities seem to imply the need for far more careful and possibly more limited capital
account liberalization until policies are in place, both nationally and internationally, to avoid
recurrent costly currency crises. They also imply the need to combine domestic financial
liberalization with simultaneous regulation of the financial sector. For small open economies in a
world of volatile capital flows, new forms of regulating the domestic financial sector may be
appropriate, which may include larger protective cushions than in developed economies for
example, higher capital adequacy ratios for banks, as well as introduction of counter-cyclical
elements into the regulatory process, to moderate boom-bust patterns of behavior (Ocampo,
1999).  It may also imply the need for accelerating and deepening reforms and policies (such as
privatization, labor market reforms, and especially more investment in human capital and
infrastructure) that encourage more FDI. These measures at the national level need to be
complemented by international measures that encourage greater stability in capital flows to
developing countries.
The importance of policies at the national and international levels to encourage far
greater stability in capital flows is particularly important for reforming economies. There seem to
be two stages in the implementation of reforms. The first stage – linked to rationalization of existing
capacity – leads to high unemployment and inequality, even when there is rapid growth. Only in the
second stage is new investment is undertaken, which leads to improvements in employment and equity
(see Moguillansky and Bielschowsky, 2000). To reach the second stage, stable capital flows are not
only important to help finance the new investment (and, if in the form of FDI, to facilitate embodied
transfer of technology), but also to avoid the major disruptions to output and investment that sharp
declines or major reversals of capital flows can cause. Financial and currency crises not only seriously
restrict availability of credit and foreign exchange for both working capital and investment; they may
also undermine for a relatively long period of time the confidence of both domestic and international
investors, as we discuss in more detail below.
In assessing the impact of foreign financial flows on Latin America, it is crucial to look
both at the broad pattern of total flows and at the composition of inflows, their conditions, and
their volatility. This paper begins by looking at the general pattern of financial flows to Latin
America over the last three decades and how the recent trend in flows fits into that overall
picture of high volatility. It then examines the links between capital flows and growth. It goes on
to look at each major category of flows – foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, and bank
lending – examining the trends of the flows and the terms and conditions on which they enter the
region. It concludes with some policy recommendations.
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II.  THE VOLATILITY OF CAPITAL FLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA
Measuring the volatility of international capital flows as a percentage of GDP to various regions
between 1970 and 1992, Hausmann and Gavin (1996) found that developing countries in general
experience greater volatility of capital flows than industrialized countries. In Latin America, the
study found that the standard deviation of capital flows as a share of GDP was 2.8 for the 1970-
1992 period, while the corresponding figure for the industrialized countries was only 1.7 (see
table 1).
Table 1
VOLATILITY OF CAPITAL FLOWS AND GDP IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1970-92










2.8 4.4 6.1 1.5 1.7
Real GDP growth 4.7 5.3 7.9 3.0 2.2
      Source: Hausmann and Gavin (1996)
Figure 1 shows net private capital flows to Latin America in constant 1990 U.S. dollars
between 1975 and 1998. Private flows were very high in the 1976-1981 period; they became
negative between 1983 and 1990; they grew rapidly till 1993, before falling in 1994 and 1995,
due to the peso crisis. In 1996 and 1997, net flows picked up again. By 1998, as a result of the
Asian crisis and its spread, capital flows declined again. Between 1975 and 1998, it is therefore
possible to define three sub-periods (1975-1981, 1982-1990, and 1991-1998); the first period has
positive net inflows, the second is the “lost decade” of the debt crisis, and the third is the return
of capital flows in the 1990s.
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Figure 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET CAPITAL FLOWS, 1975-1998










































































a Data were deflated by the U.S. consumer price index.
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of IMF data.
Table 2 shows the mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation for each of the
sub-periods based on the data provided in figure 1. These calculations show that the volume of
capital flows to Latin America were of about the same magnitude in the 1990s in relation to the
previous inflow period, but they were more volatile. Thus, the mean was about the same in 1975-
1981 as in 1991-1998, but the standard deviations for inflows were 8 and 17, while the
coefficients of variation were 18 and 37, respectively. This meant that the surges and declines
that were far more frequent in the 1990s than in the 1970s and 1980s. On the positive side, the
recoveries of flows after crises seem also quicker (see figure 1).
Table 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF CAPITAL FLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA, 1975-1998
Period Meana Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation
1975-81 45.6 8.1 17.8
1982-90 -15.4 9.6 -62.3
1991-98 44.9 16.7 37.1
 a Billions of 1990 dollars.
 Source:  Author’s calculations based on data in figure 1.
13
It can be hypothesized that technological and institutional developments, which may
reflect secular trends, explain the increase in volatility of capital flows during the 1990s. Clearly
the development of information technology has increased the speed with which capital can flow
in and out of countries and, more generally, the speed and ease with which financial transactions
can be made and reversed. Furthermore, it has been argued that the growing importance of
institutional investors together with the increasing international diversification of their assets, the
risk and reward structures of delegated portfolio fund managers, and the growing appetite for
liquid, transferable securities that can be easily sold may also be contributing to the increased
volatility of capital flows to developing countries.
One factor is the sheer massive scale of institutional investors’ assets, which surpass
US$40 trillion (see Griffith-Jones, 1998 and World Bank, 1997). This contrasts with the
relatively small size of many recipient markets.  This asymmetry highlights the potential for
volatility as marginal portfolio adjustments by institutional investors can lead to massive changes
in the level of capital flows to individual countries. According to BIS (1998) estimates, a
hypothetical shift of 1 percent of equity holdings by G-7 institutional investors would be
equivalent to over 66 percent of the Latin American equity markets.
A second factor is linked to risk/reward structures of fund managers and, in particular, to
the frequent evaluation of fund managers’ investment performance against market benchmarks
or against peer performance. As a result fund managers fear underperformance, because it can
imply loss of business and therefore lower fees; this discourages positions different from
benchmarks or from the average of their peers. There is evidence that these incentives contribute
to herding, and therefore to high volatility of capital flows.
A third, broader factor may be linked to the fact that capital market financing is more
rapidly affected by changes in market sentiment, as securities investors have looser relationships
with borrowers and are more influenced by daily price movements – as they mark to market their
assets – than are commercial banks (BIS, 1999). This would help explain why fund managers
withdrew earlier than commercial banks in East Asia (BIS, 1998). Evidence on this point is not
totally clear cut, however, as various types of intermediaries – especially large ones – have
adopted similar risk management systems. Nevertheless, the fact that different actors (e.g.,
banks, pension funds, and mutual funds) have highly correlated strategies may contribute to an
aggravation of capital flow volatility and of the scale of asset price movements. Combined with
the asymmetries of scale between global assets and the size of Latin American economies, this
opens the possible danger that in the future high capital flow volatility will remain or even
increase, particularly if effective measures are not taken nationally and internationally to
counteract this volatility.
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III.  THE LINK BETWEEN CAPITAL FLOWS, INVESTMENT AND GROWTH
The volatility of capital flows is important because it can have serious negative effects on the
real economies of recipient countries. Economic downturns and particularly financial crises,
which often result from or are aggravated by volatile financial flows, have a negative impact on
growth and often result in reduced investment in both physical and human capital. The
experience of Mexico during the peso crisis of 1994-1995 showed how a financial crisis can
result in serious disturbances to production and investment. Mexican GDP fell by 7 percent in
1995, many firms had to close, investment and consumption levels fell dramatically, and the
country's banking system was severely weakened.
Table 3 shows that volatility of capital flows is not only higher in Latin America than in
developed economies, but its cost is also higher. The table compares the cost in terms of lost
output of banking and currency crises in emerging economies to industrialized economies. In
general, resolution costs of banking crises in industrialized countries have been held at under 10
percent of GDP, whereas in several emerging market countries, particularly Latin America, the
costs have been much larger (IMF, 1998).
Table 3















Currency crises 158 1.6 4.3 61 7.1
     Industrial 42 1.9 3.1 55 5.6
     Emerging market 116 1.5 4.8 64 7.6
Currency "crashes"5 55 2.0 7.1 71 10.1
     Industrial 13 2.1 5.0 62 8.0
     Emerging market 42 1.9 7.9 74 10.7
Currency and banking crises6 32 3.2 14.4 78 18.5
     Industrial 6 5.8 17.6 100 17.6
     Emerging market 26 2.6 13.6 73 18.8
1 Average amount of time until GDP growth returned to trend. Because GDP growth data are available for all countries only on
an annual basis, by construction the minimum recovery time was one year.
2 Calculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the crisis began until the time when
annual output growth returned to its trend and by averaging over all crises.
3 Percent of crises in which output was lower than trend after the crisis began.
4 Calculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the crisis began until the time when
annual output growth returned to its trend and by averaging over all crises that had output losses.
5 Currency “crashes” are identified by crises where the currency component of the exchange market pressure index accounts for
75 percent or more of the index when the index signals a crisis.
6 Identified when a banking crisis occurred within a year of a currency crisis.
Source: IMF (1998).
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Highly volatile capital flows, and the costly currency and banking crises that are often
associated with them in developing countries, can have a serious negative impact on growth
rates.  Between the mid-1970s and the present, not only have capital flows to Latin America been
highly volatile, but GDP growth in the region has also been highly volatile.  Latin America as a
whole has experienced more and deeper recessions than most other regions of the world
(Hausmann and Gavin, 1996).
Figure 2 plots the data on capital flows to Latin America as a share of GDP against the
growth rate of GDP in Latin America over the same period. It shows that there is a very strong
correlation between the growth rate of GDP in Latin America and capital inflows to the region.
During the inflow period 1976-1981, the region grew at an average rate of around 4.5 percent per
year, while receiving capital flows at a similar share of GDP. During the period of capital
scarcity, between 1982 and 1990, growth fell to less than 1 percent per year, while capital flows
to the region became negative at -1.7 percent of GDP. During the 1990s, GDP growth and capital
inflows have continued to follow a very similar pattern.  Both capital inflows and growth rose
considerably in the years immediately preceding the Mexican peso crisis, with GDP growth
peaking at 5.8 per cent in 1994; growth fell sharply in 1995, while capital flows also fell as a
result of the peso crisis and its spillover effects in Argentina and Uruguay. There was then a
marked parallel recovery in both capital inflows and growth during the 1996-1997 period, when
GDP growth in the region averaged 4.4 percent, before the decline in both flows and growth that
have resulted from the international financial crisis.
Figure 2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
















Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official data
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The relationship between GDP growth and capital flows is partly non-causal, as both are
affected by other economic variables. Fluctuations of GDP growth in Latin America are a result
of a number of factors, both domestic and external, of which volatile capital flows is only one,
though clearly a very important one. Moreover, the causality between flows and growth to some
extent runs both ways as high rates of growth are one of the factors that attract foreign finance to
developing economies. Nonetheless, the relationship between GDP growth and capital flows in
Latin America, clearly illustrated in figure 2, is very striking. It is safe to conclude that capital
inflows contribute to higher levels of growth, and that the sharp reductions or reversals in flows
(especially if they lead to balance of payments and financial crises) have a strong contractionary
impact on the region's economies.
The effect of changes in levels of net capital flows on the expansion of GDP occurs in the
first instance via the impact of flows on imports, although a number of other mechanisms – such
as variations in levels of domestic bank lending – are also important. Thus, large inflows enable
higher imports, which first permit an increased use of existing productive capacity that,
facilitated by higher aggregate demand, leads to growth of output and employment. In a second
moment – if capital flows continue, spare productive capacity is used up, and confidence of
private actors increases – flows may increase levels of investment, which would increase the
likelihood of leading to more sustainable growth (Corden, 1990).
In this scenario of sustained growth, all sorts of positive effects of the capital flows could
interact with positive impacts from the reforms. These include the transfer of more efficient
embodied technology that increases productivity, as well as more dynamic responses from
entrepreneurs, who see their efforts at investing and innovating rewarded by higher profits and
growth.
There is also a less rosy and unfortunately more common scenario. When capital flows
decline or are totally reversed, this leads in the first instance to a sharp contraction of imports (as
exports are slower to respond); the contraction in imports leads to a fall in growth (see figure 2).
These links operated particularly clearly for Latin America in the 1983-1989 period, when the
sharp reversal of capital flows and the large increase in debt servicing were major factors
explaining the dramatic fall in imports (of around 40 percent in the first instance), which was a
major factor in explaining Latin America’s extremely poor growth performance during those
years. The sharp declines or reversals of flows in the 1990s also led to lower imports and lower
growth.
As Devlin, Ffrench-Davis and Griffith-Jones (1995) argued, several pre-conditions need
to be met for capital flows to produce sustained growth, that is for a virtuous “debt cycle” to take
place. These include: a) a high proportion of the inflows should go into investment; b) the
additional investment should be efficient; c) a large proportion of the increased investment
should go into tradeables, so as to help create a trade surplus that would help service the flows in
the future, and d) creditors and investors must be willing to provide stable and predictable capital
flows on reasonable terms. As experience has shown, these conditions are difficult to meet
simultaneously in practice. Furthermore, after the East Asian crisis we have learned that there is
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an additional condition that needs to be met for capital flows to contribute to sustainable growth,
which is that increases in investment, particularly in exports, should not be in sectors where there
is risk of global overproduction (Kaplinsky, 1998).
It is unfortunately both difficult and rare, at least in recent Latin American economic
history, for large surges of capital flows to lead to sustained growth. This may relate to the fact
that the above listed pre-conditions are difficult to meet. Furthermore, some of the effects on the
domestic economy induced by the initial surge of capital unfortunately make it more difficult for
flows to be maintained and to contribute to sustainable growth (Reisen, 1999).
Large surges of capital flows tend to contribute to overvalued exchange rates, whatever
the exchange rate regime adopted. This overevaluation discourages investment in tradeables, and
especially in exports, which are meant to be one of the most dynamic sectors in a reformed
economy. There is also evidence that overvalued (as well as volatile) exchange rates discourage
all investment. More broadly, volatility in key macroeconomic variables – not only exchange
rates but also domestic credit levels, asset values, interest rates and the rate of growth itself –
have a negative effect on investment levels via business expectations, as they increase
uncertainty about future profitability of investment. As investors have the option of delaying
investment until more information arrives, there exists an opportunity cost of investing now
rather than waiting (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Therefore, increased volatility in macroeconomic
variables, which augments uncertainty, requires a far higher expected rate of return in order to
justify investment.  As a result, increased macroeconomic uncertainty reduces the level of private
investment, as various empirical studies have show. This is negative for future growth.
For obvious reasons, overvalued exchange rates encourage growth of current account
deficits. As this trend continues, and as foreign exchange liabilities (especially short-term)
increase, the likelihood increases of a reversal of capital flows and a currency crisis. Such a
currency crisis (or a major over-shooting of the exchange rate, to imply a devaluation much
larger than required by fundamentals) will increase the risk of a banking crisis in Latin America.
Both phenomena have tended to cause short-term declines in output and to discourage
investment, which discourages future growth.
Another negative interaction between capital flows and sustainable growth operates via
the impact on the fiscal balance and public investment (Fitzgerald, 1999). With a surge of short-
term capital inflows, there is a change in market perceptions about what they will accept as a
sustainable public debt ratio. As this increases, the “permitted” fiscal deficit can rise quite
sharply for a transition period, given the space opened by the higher debt ratio and higher
expected growth rate. Once foreign creditors and lenders see the cumulative effect of their
individual decisions, however, sentiment can change suddenly, possibly even to a lower public
debt ratio than before the initial favorable change of perception. The market then requires that a
large fiscal surplus be generated to finance repayment of existing debt stock to reduce the debt
ratio. As taxes are difficult to increase rapidly and current spending is difficult to cut, public
investment tends to the main adjustment mechanism. Sharp fluctuations in public investment are
very negative, as efficiency is lost both when projects are started too rapidly and ongoing ones
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are frozen or delayed once started. Also the volatility and resulting inefficiency of public
investment negatively affects private investment because there often are strong
complementarities between them.
A final, external reason that it is difficult for surges of short-term capital to contribute to
sustained growth is related to the volatile nature of capital flows themselves. Rather than faithful
companions, capital flows are fair weather friends.  Their love of a country may quickly change,
due to a deterioration in key variables (such as current account deficits, fiscal deficits or the ratio
of short-term foreign liabilities to reserves) that they themselves partly contributed to create or
because of external factors, such as variations in developed countries’ interest rates (Mexico, late
1994) or contagion from currency crises in other emerging markets (Brazil, early 1999).
A key determinant of capital flow volatility is the term structure of net inflows. Figure 3
shows the breakdown of private capital flows to Latin America between 1990 and 1998 into
foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, and other investment. The latter is largely made up of
bank lending and other investment flows such as trade credits. The figure shows that both
portfolio flows (bonds and equity), which tend to be more liquid, and bank lending, around 50
percent of which was short-term in this period, have been more volatile during the 1990s than
foreign direct investment.
Figure 3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPOSITION OF NET CAPITAL FLOWS,  1990-1998
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    Source:  World Bank (1999) and ECLAC (1999).
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Figure 3 shows that net portfolio flows rose significantly between 1991 and 1993. In this
period, Latin America relied heavily on these portfolio flows. This pattern changed after 1994, as
a result of the peso crisis in Mexico. Portfolio flows declined, while FDI flows remained steady.
In 1996, portfolio flows showed a significant recovery and remained fairly steady through 1997.
FDI flows continued to increase steadily, constituting a growing share of total flows to the
region. In 1997 FDI made up 61 per cent of net capital flows to Latin America, portfolio flows
and bank loans represented 43 per cent, while other net investment was negative.
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IV.  COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL FLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA
1.  Foreign Direct Investment
Global levels of FDI flows increased significantly during the 1990s, reaching nearly US$400
billion in 1997. In recent years, the distribution between countries has been shifting with
developing countries receiving an increasing proportion of these flows and Latin America's share
increasing to around 44 percent to developing countries in 1997. In 1997, Latin America and the
Caribbean received FDI flows of US$56 billion, rising to US$60 billion in 1998. This figure
represents a significant increase compared with the levels of FDI flows in previous years (see
figure 4).
Figure 4
LATIN AMERICA: NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS, 1990-1998










































Others:  Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official and IMF figures.
In addition to the increasing levels during the 1990s, another important feature of FDI
flows to Latin America was their stability during periods of turmoil as is evident by looking at
figure 3. Whereas portfolio flows and bank lending were very sensitive to market disruptions and
therefore extremely volatile, FDI remained stable throughout the turbulent 1990s. Not only was
FDI more stable in itself, but it also helped to stabilize the current account by expanding capacity
22
in the tradeable goods sector. In 1997, FDI represented around 60 percent of total private flows
to the region, and this figure increased in 1998 to around three fourths of total flows.  FDI as a
proportion of total flows to Latin America had reached similar levels in 1995, following the peso
crisis.
Returning to the distribution of FDI flows within the region, figure 4 shows the increasing
importance of Brazil as a recipient of FDI inflows during the 1990s. In 1996, Brazil took over from
Mexico as the main recipient of FDI in Latin America. In 1997, Brazil received 30 percent of FDI
flows to the region, followed by Mexico and Argentina, with 19 percent and 10 percent respectively;
Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela also received around 10 percent. These six countries, together with
Peru, were the most important FDI recipients in the region.
The three main mechanisms for FDI inflows are the acquisition of private assets, the
privatization of state assets, and investment in new assets (ECLAC, 1998). In the first half of the
1990s, the privatization of state-owned enterprises was the main avenue for FDI inflows to Latin
America. Then, in the period 1994-1996, an increasing proportion of FDI inflows were dedicated
to new investment, with the restructuring and modernization of existing foreign-owned
companies in the region as well as of recently privatized state industries. In 1997, the transfer of
assets, both public and private, again took over as the primary reason for FDI flows to Latin
America. This trend was particularly strong in the larger economies, such as Brazil, Argentina,
Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Chile. In those countries where the privatization process was
in its later stages, such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Peru, the sale of private assets was more
important than the privatization of state firms.
The United States has been the source of the largest proportion of FDI flows to Latin
America in recent years, followed by Europe. Regional trading agreements have encouraged FDI
flows to the countries of the region involved, such as NAFTA (Mexico) and MERCOSUR
(Brazil and Argentina). In Mexico in the early 1990s, there was a boom in foreign direct
investment following the announcement and ratification of the NAFTA agreement, together with
the far-reaching economic reforms in that country. Later in the decade, Brazil took over in
importance as economic reforms and the privatization process brought FDI flooding in.
Privatization has been an extremely important source of revenue for Latin American countries;
between 1985 and 1992, more than 2,000 publicly-owned firms (such as public utilities, banks and
airlines) were privatized throughout the region (ECLAC, 1998). Early privatizing countries included
Chile and Argentina, while Mexico and Peru have also carried out major privatization programs. More
recently, Brazil has become the region's most important privatizing country; in 1998, Brazil received
privatization receipts of around US$6 billion (including from the sale of Telebras).
Brazil's privatization program has been part of a “second wave” of privatization in Latin
America, which involved the sale of state assets, often though concessions, allowing private
sector activity in areas previously considered preserves of the state. Examples include the
opening of new markets, such as that for mobile telephones, and private investment in sectors
such as mining and petroleum. Foreign investment in these sectors has often taken the form of
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joint ventures with local companies. While this type of investment does not increase the
productive capacity of the recipient country, it does serve to improve the quality of services
(mainly in energy, telecommunications, and transport) and increase competitiveness.
Privatization, in general, also acts as a springboard for further FDI flows.
2.  Portfolio Investment
Before 1989, Latin America and the Caribbean only had limited access to the international bond
market. Since then, however, the region has enjoyed extensive access to this market, and the
importance of bond financing as a source of external finance to Latin America has risen
significantly. Figure 5 shows that the volume of international bond issues in Latin America and
the Caribbean rose from US$2.8 billion in 1990 to a peak of US$54.4 billion in 1997, before
falling in 1998.
Figure 5
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES, 1990-1998














a Bahamas, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica,
Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official and IMF figures.
Figure 5 shows that international bond issues by Latin American countries fell off during
the peso crisis in 1994 and 1995, before rising again rapidly to record levels in 1996 and 1997,
but falling in 1998, a trend that is expected to continue. The countries most active in the bond
market have been Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina followed by Venezuela, Chile, and Colombia.
In 1997, Argentina and Brazil issued bonds amounting to around US$15 billion, Mexico US$14











In addition to the growth in the volume of bonds issued in Latin America, the size of new
bond issues also increased during the 1990s. Bond financing is relatively expensive for Latin
America; bond margins for Latin America have been high, particularly in Brazil and Argentina.
Moreover, spreads, which had been falling since the peso crisis, rose sharply as a result of the
international financial crisis, with spreads on Venezuelan and Brazilian bonds most affected.
This trend increased following the Russian devaluation and debt moratorium in mid-August
1998. Figure 6 shows how the international financial crisis affected the conditions facing
international bond issuers in Latin America.
Figure 6
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                     Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official and World Bank figures.
The crisis has also reversed the previous improvement in the average maturities of Latin
American bond issues. Average maturities had remained steady at around 3-4 years from 1989
until 1995, before increasing significantly to 8 years in 1996, and again to 15 years in 1997. This
was seen as a very positive shift as the longer maturities reduced the potential volatility of bond
flows, which make up a large share of total flows to the region. As we can see in Figure 6,
maturities fell in the last quarter of 1997 to 7.6 years and remained at about that level. On the
previous trend of rising maturities of Latin American bonds, it is worth noting that the share of
bonds issued with options had also increased in the same period. Since options allow the lender
to pull out before the official maturity date, the apparently less potentially volatile bond flows
may have actually been little better than in previous years. The impact of bond options has been
particularly dramatic in the case of Brazil, where the share of bonds issued with options
increased sharply after 1996. Furthermore, the Weston Group has estimated that of US$7.5
billion due in 1999, almost half (around US$3 billion) will originate in the exercise of put
options (Financial Times, March 18, 1999).
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International share issues have also been an important source of capital for Latin
American countries in the 1990s, although to a much lesser extent than bond issues.  Share issues
rose from US$4 billion in 1991, to nearly US$5 billion in 1994 (ECLAC, 1999). Issues fell
sharply as a result of the Mexican peso crisis however and unlike bond issues recovered only
gradually, failing to reach pre-crisis levels.
3.  Bank Lending
The importance of bank lending in total private capital flows to Latin America is significantly
less in the 1990s than it had been in the 1970s. Figure 7 shows the steady growth in the
outstanding claims of BIS reporting banks to Latin America from around US$200 billion in
1993-1994 to US$295.7 billion in mid-1998. The financial turbulence following the Asian crisis
did not stop the growth of outstanding claims of BIS reporting banks to Latin America in the first
half of 1998. However, IMF figures suggest that while foreign banks may have been increasing
their exposure to Latin America during the first half of 1998, net bank lending flows to the
region were in fact negative for the second half of 1998.
Figure 7
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING BY TYPE OF BORROWER, 1993-1998
































































     Source: BIS (various).
The share of short-term claims (up to one year) on Latin America increased somewhat
during the 1990s, from around 37 percent in 1991 to around 55 percent in the first half of 1998.
This rise can mostly be accounted for between 1991 and 1993, when the share rose to about 50
percent.  The share of short-term claims on lending to Latin America compares quite well to the
share for lending to Asia, where the figure remained at over 60 percent between 1992 and 1997.
As regards the sectorial composition of claims, there has been a gradual shift away from
interbank lending and in favor of direct non-bank exposure.
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V.  CONCLUSIONS
Capital flows to Latin America have reached very high levels in the 1990s. Except for FDI,
which has been a growing proportion of flows to Latin America and has provided a source of
stability to the region, all other capital flows to the region are very volatile. Not only are their
levels volatile, which is the most problematic feature, but their conditions (both in terms of
maturity and cost) also fluctuate strongly. Furthermore, some of the fluctuations in conditions
(e.g., maturity) are difficult to detect statistically, as formal maturities may remain the same, but
de facto ones can fall due to financial engineering mechanisms such as put options.
Private capital flows to Latin America are much more volatile than capital flows to
developed countries. This volatility of capital flows, transmitted to volatility of macroeconomic
variables, is very negative both for growth and investment. A number of mechanisms explain the
negative link between volatility and growth; the main long-term one seems to be that the
increased uncertainty caused by volatility significantly undermines private-sector confidence and
therefore discourages investment.
It would be desirable if capital flows were more stable, as this would allow virtuous
interactions to develop. If capital flows in for a significant period, and it finances efficient
investment with an important proportion in tradeables, it will generate sufficient growth, savings
and trade surpluses to allow for the servicing of the inflows in future years. Such a virtuous circle
worked well for example in the United States in the nineteenth century.
A virtuous circle of relatively stable capital flows would be particularly valuable and
essential for reforming economies, where new and increased investment is essential to allow the
economy to adapt to important changes in relative prices and in the overall context of economic
policy and to generate increased growth. In contrast, very volatile capital flows, by increasing
uncertainty and causing currency and banking crises, may be particularly harmful for reforming
economies. By undermining the ability of the economy to generate the increased growth that
could result from the reforms, there is the risk that they could even undermine political support
for the reform process itself.
At present the outlook for capital flows to Latin America and more broadly to emerging
markets is uncertain. Three key questions and concerns arise. First, will capital flows return to
the average high levels that prevailed in the 1990s? Second, if so, what will be their
composition? Will they be dominated by more stable FDI or by more volatile short-term flows?
Third, will capital flows to the region be as volatile as they have been in recent years?
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It is crucial that policies be designed – nationally, regionally and internationally – to help
attract long-term flows and discourage potentially volatile as well as reversible capital flows. In
particular, emphasis should be placed on reforms that encourage more stable flows such as FDI,
whereas reforms that encourage more volatile flows should be postponed.
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